Rudden, Bernard. “Things as Thing and Things as Wealth.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 14, no. 1 (1994): 81–97. --- > The feudal calculus lives and breeds, but its habitat is welath not land. Ownership normally implies a few things - someone who owns a thing may, with impunity, destroy it; and so may, of course, give it away for nothing - things may be used as security for debt obligations The above propositions do not apply to a trustee's relation to a trust property. > A thing may be treated for itself and be possessed, used, and disposed of for its own qualities, however banal they be. In this case the legal regime applicable treats the object as unique: it is this house we own and live in, this book we sell and no other. On the other hand every thing may be treated merely as the clothing (in-vestment) worn by a certain amount of wealth. In this case the relevant law accords it the modest role of a member of a class, perfectly replaceable and subject to an implacable regime of real subrogation.